Cash for
Clunkers:

Did it Work or Not?
B Y A N T H O N Y C L A R K ,
A N N E T T E N A J J A R , A N D
R A L P H W I E D N E R
The voluntary vehicle trade-in program that passed
into law under the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and
Save Act of 2009—also known as the Car Allowance
Rebate System or CARS—has been among the more
widely discussed and debated government spending
programs in recent years. Referred to in the popular media
as Cash for Clunkers, the program offered consumers
a rebate for trading in used vehicles for qualifying new
vehicles. The program had two purposes: first, to increase
spending and employment during a time of recession
by stimulating the automobile industry; and second, to
address environmental concerns by increasing the average
fuel efficiency of the U.S. auto fleet (NHTSA 2009).
This case study focuses on the first point. Analyzing
survey data collected from 22 new-car dealers in St.
Charles County, Missouri, our research team estimates
the initial direct impact of Cash for Clunkers on sales
of new motor vehicles in the county. We then use
output multipliers from the regional economic model
IMPLAN (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc.) to estimate
the total economic impact of Cash for Clunkers on the
county’s output after taking multiplier effects (explained
below) into account. Utilizing data from the Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA), along with estimates of direct
government spending in the county on CARS vouchers,
we also estimate the total change in employment in the
county attributable to the Cash for Clunkers program.
Even though most of the economic impact of Cash for
Clunkers occurred through new-car sales, we also briefly
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discuss how Cash for Clunkers affected used-car sales.
Additionally, we consider whether Cash for Clunkers
created a true stimulative effect or if, as some analysts
have argued, the program merely caused consumers to
move their car purchases forward into the CARS rebate
period (see, for example, Edmunds.com 2009). This
research represents the first assessment of the impact of
Cash for Clunkers on a regional economy. It is also the
only study, to our knowledge, that surveyed automobile
dealers regarding their experience with and attitudes
toward the program.

An Overview of the CARS Program

Although Cash for Clunkers was a novel concept to
many Americans, voluntary vehicle trade-in programs—
more commonly referred to in the academic literature as
vehicle scrappage programs—are certainly not new. The
Swedish government implemented the first such program
in 1976, and other EU nations have done so since (Allan,
et al. 2009). The first vehicle scrappage program that
appeared in the U.S., dating back to 1990, was actually
a private sector initiative. Instituted in the Los Angeles
area by UNOCAL,1 the Southern California Retired
Automobile Program (SCRAP) offered owners of pre1971 cars $700 to voluntarily relinquish their vehicles for
scrapping. SCRAP was deemed a success because, during
a four-month period, UNOCAL removed 8,736 “dirty”
vehicles from the streets of Los Angeles (Shaheen, et al.
1994). Following SCRAP’s success, similar programs

were implemented in other states, including Delaware
(1992), Illinois (1993), and Colorado (1993-1994) (Allan,
et al. 2009). Early vehicle scrappage programs in the
U.S. and elsewhere generally focused on reducing criteria
pollutant emissions, while recent programs (those starting
in 2009) have been primarily aimed at stimulating the
automobile industry (Allan, et al. 2009).
Cash for Clunkers, launched on July 27, 2009, was
one of a number of stimulus programs whose purpose
was to “shift expenditures by households, businesses,
and governments from the future to the present” (CEA
2009). Congress initially appropriated $1 billion for the
program. Because consumers responded in much greater
numbers than expected, that entire sum was exhausted
within three days. This prompted Congress to allocate
additional funds to the program. By the time the CARS
rebate period ended on August 24, 2009, a total of 690,114
vehicles had been traded in under the program, with a final
count of 677,842 paid vouchers. The average rebate was
$4,209 per traded-in vehicle, and the total dollar amount of
rebates issued through the program nationwide was $2.85
billion (NHTSA, Report, 2009). According to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the
agency that administered the program, participation in
Cash for Clunkers on a per-capita basis was highest in the
Midwestern states and several Northeastern and Atlantic
seaboard states and much lower in most Southern and
some Western states (NHTSA, Report, 2009).
Cash for Clunkers offered consumers a rebate of
$3,500 or $4,500 per traded-in vehicle, depending on the
vehicle category and the fuel-efficiency rating of the new
vehicle compared to the trade-in vehicle. Table 1 outlines
the basic credit allowances under the program.
The program had other key requirements. The new
vehicle had to carry a base manufacturer’s suggested
retail price of $45,000 or less, traded-in vehicles had to
be registered and insured for the year prior to the tradein date, and the engines of all the traded-in vehicles had
to be disabled by a prescribed method. Dealers were
required to store the traded-in vehicles until they were
disabled at the dealership or a property under the control
of the dealership; dealers were required to use salvage
facilities or salvage auctions approved by the NHTSA;
and the salvagers that received the traded-in vehicles were
instructed to shred them within six months (NHTSA, Rule,
2009). Dealers were required to disclose to buyers the best
estimate of the scrappage value of the traded-in vehicles,
less a $50 administrative fee. Additionally, dealers were
not allowed to use the CARS credit to offset any other
rebates or discounts (NHTSA, Rule, 2009). Dealers were
asked to submit all the necessary paperwork to the NHTSA
through a dedicated website (www.CARS.gov) that also
served as an information center for auto dealers and
consumers.

Prior Analyses of the Program

Analyses of the Cash for Clunkers program appear to
be ongoing, but to date there has not been a comprehensive
independent analysis of the total economic impact of

The Survey Questionnaire
The survey questionnaire for new-car dealers
asked a series of questions related to sales before,
during, and after the CARS rebate period. Among
other questions, new-car dealers were asked how
many $3,500 and $4,500 vouchers they turned in;
the average price of cars sold through the CARS
program; the average Manufacturer’s Suggested
Retail Price (MSRP) of the vehicles sold through
CARS; the number of vehicles they had sold during
the same time period in 2008; the number of vehicles
that came in under CARS that were not eligible,
but that the dealer accepted for trade anyway; and
what number of vehicles the dealership believed
that it sold due to Cash for Clunkers that would not
have sold without the program. In addition to these
questions, dealers were asked a series of questions
related to the operational aspects of the program: the
average length of time in days the dealer had to wait
to receive payment on traded-in clunkers; whether the
dealer’s business operations were impacted by delays
in receiving payment from the government; whether
sales during the CARS rebate period were hampered
by issues with depleted inventory; and the average
net amount received by the dealership for the disabled
clunkers. The survey also solicited qualitative data,
asking respondents what recommendations they
would make regarding changes to the program’s
structure if another program like Cash for Clunkers
were ever considered again in the future.
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the program. Much of the analysis by independent (i.e.,
non-government) economists has been in the form of
commentary and estimates of the type often referred to
as “back-of-the-envelope.” The most comprehensive
analyses to date are both government agency reports:
one by President Barack Obama’s CEA in September
2009 and the other by the NHTSA in December 2009.
Non-government analyses of the program that are more
sophisticated than back-of-the-envelope estimates include
a study by economic consulting and modeling firm REMI
(2009), a study by the automotive website Edmunds.
com (2009), and various estimates of the program’s
impact on industry sales and/or national GDP by J.D.
Power and Associates (2009), IHS Global Insight (2009),
and Macroeconomic Advisers (2009). Most of these
analyses—government and non-government—are not
truly comprehensive because most overlook the potential
impacts of Cash for Clunkers on the used-vehicle market
and the market for auto salvage. Only one, the study
by NHTSA, directly addresses, albeit minimally, the
program’s impact on these after-markets.
With respect to estimating the stimulative impact
of Cash for Clunkers, the CEA’s report aptly frames the
essential research questions.
The first step in our analysis is to estimate the effect of
the CARS program on motor vehicle sales, because sales
are the ultimate driver of production and employment. But
in calculating the effect of the program, we must know
not just how many sales occurred, but how many sales
would have occurred anyway (even without the program);
the CARS program can be credited with an effect on sales
only for those sales that would not have taken place in
its absence. We also need to make assumptions about the
extent to which the CARS-induced sales were borrowed
from sales that would have occurred in the near future
(CEA 2009).
The phenomenon described by the CEA, sales
“borrowed” from the near future, is called the “pull-

forward” or “payback” effect (see “The Payback Effect,”
p. 22), and it is a critical issue in estimating the true
stimulative effect of a vehicle scrappage program such
as Cash for Clunkers. Common sense dictates that some
portion of new-car sales during the rebate period must
have been borrowed or pulled forward from a near-future
period. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that some
sales transactions also took place that would not have
occurred until a much later time period in the program’s
absence.
What the payback or pull-forward effect really boils
down to is consumer motivation or, more precisely,
how Cash for Clunkers may have altered the behavior
of American consumers. One can imagine there being
five basic types of consumers that would purchase a
motor vehicle during the CARS rebate period due to
the existence of the program. Table 2 defines the five
consumer types in relation to CARS and specifies whether
the vehicle purchases of each would contribute to an
economic stimulus during a time of recession.
The Edmunds.com study contends that the large
majority of consumers who purchased new vehicles
during the CARS rebate period belonged to either the
Type 1 or Type 2 categories listed in Table 2. Note that to
the extent Type 4 consumers participated in the program,
Cash for Clunkers effected used-car sales in a negative
fashion (discussed in greater detail below); however,
such consumers definitely contributed to the economic
stimulus intended by the government. To the extent Type 5
consumers were affected by the program, the government
enjoyed a bonus effect from tax dollars spent on the
rebates.
The CEA uses a different approach to estimate the
size of the payback effect and concludes that roughly
440,000 new vehicles were sold due to Cash for Clunkers
with a payback ranging from 20,000 to 90,000 vehicles
in September 2009. In its three scenarios—pessimistic,
baseline, and optimistic—the CEA assumes that all car

Is 22 Dealers Enough?
Even though the survey yielded a 59 percent response rate, the survey population is relatively small, just 22
dealers. A high response rate from a small population still yields a small sample size, and there are well-known
caveats associated with making inferences from data based on small sample sizes. It is possible that the dealers
who responded to the survey are unrepresentative of the dealers who elected not to respond? For example, perhaps
dealers that sold substantially more than the average number of vehicles through Cash for Clunkers were still too
busy processing paperwork and playing “catch up” to take time to complete the survey. Or, perhaps, dealers that sold
substantially fewer than the average number of vehicles through the program ignored the survey out of some feeling
of chagrin.
Although either of the above situations is possible—as well as other potential reasons that respondents are
unrepresentative of non-respondents—we believe the concern over small sample size in this study is mitigated by
several facts. First, our estimates are in the form of ranges that take into account an appropriate margin of error
given the sample size. Because of the small sample size, our estimated ranges are relatively large by necessity.
Second, we used state-level NHTSA data as a check against our estimated ranges. Third, although only thirteen (59
percent) of 22 new-car dealers in the county responded to the survey, those dealers who responded represent the vast
majority of sales in the county. In fact, we estimate that the respondents to the survey account for at least 75 percent
of new-vehicle sales that occurred in St. Charles County through the Cash for Clunkers program.
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TABLE 1

NHTSA Final Rule: Determining Eligibility of Trade-in Vehicles and New Vehicles
Vehicle Categories

Description

Trade-in Eligibility
(1)

New Vehicle (2)
Eligibility

Credit Amounts

Passenger
automobiles

Vehicles
manufactured
primarily for
transporting persons.

A combined fuel
economy value of
18 mpg or less

A minimum
combined fuel
economy level
of 22 mpg

If new vehicle has
a combined fuel
economy that is
4-9 mpg higher than
the trade-in: $3,500.
If new vehicle has
a combined fuel
economy that is at
least 10 mpg than
the trade-in: $4,500

Category 1 trucks

Vehicles not
manufactured
primarily for
transporting persons,
including all SUVs,
minivans, small
and medium pickup
trucks, and certain
vehicles that permit
expanded use for
cargo-carrying
purposes, including
vehicles designed to
transport more than
ten persons.

A combined fuel
economy value of
18 mpg or less

A minimum
combined fuel
economy level of at
least 18 mpg

If new vehicle is a
category 1 truck,
and trade-in is a
passenger vehicle,
category 1 truck or
category 2 truck, a
gain of
2-4 mpg=$3,500
and a gain of at least
5 mpg=$4,500.

Category 2 trucks

A large van or a
large pickup truck

A combined fuel
economy value of
18 mpg or less

A minimum
combined fuel
economy level of at
least 15 mpg

For a category
2 truck traded-in for
a new category
2 truck, a gain of
1 mpg=$3,500 and a
gain of at least
2 mpg=$4,500.

Category 3 trucks

Very large pickup
trucks and very large
cargo vans rated
between 8,500 and
10,000 pounds gross
vehicle weight.

No minimum
fuel economy
requirement

No minimum
fuel economy
requirement

A category 3 truck
traded-in for a new
category
2 truck=$3,500
without fuel gain
restrictions.
A category 3 truck
traded for a new
category 3 truck of
smaller of similar
size=$3,500 (3)

(1) The first three criteria are the same for all categories—be in a drivable condition, have been continuously insured.
(2) Purchased or leased (not less than 5 years). For all categories, vehicle must have a manufacturer’s suggested retail price
(base price) of $45,000 or less.
(3) Credits for category 3 trucks limited to 7.5 percent of the total funds appropriated for the program.
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owners purchasing a vehicle through Cash for Clunkers
would have replaced their clunkers anyway within three,
five, and seven years, respectively. Altogether, CEA
estimates that Cash for Clunkers caused new-car sales
in 2009 to increase by about 210,000 vehicles in the
pessimistic scenario, 330,000 vehicles in the baseline
scenario, and 560,000 vehicles in the optimistic scenario.
This translates to GDP growth in the third quarter of
2009 of about 0.1 percentage points under the pessimistic
scenario, 0.2 percentage points under the baseline scenario,

and nearly 0.4 percentage points under the optimistic
scenario. The CEA notes, however, that “[t]he boost to
the level of GDP is temporary, and is followed by a drop
that slightly more than reverses the increase, reflecting the
slightly lower level of sales in the ‘payback’ period” (CEA
2009). Regarding job growth, the CEA estimates that Cash
for Clunkers created around 20,000 job-years in the second
half of 2009 under the pessimistic scenario, 35,000 jobyears under the baseline scenario, and 60,000 job-years
under the optimistic scenario (CEA 2009).

What About Used Cars?
To our knowledge, the analysis by NHTSA is the only study to date that even mentions the impact of Cash for
Clunkers on the used-car and salvage markets. NHTSA only briefly addresses the used-car market in its report to
Congress; the entirety of its analysis of that market is contained in the following paragraph:
Used vehicle prices increased for the six-month period prior to the start of the program. This trend
in price increase has been sustained since. While the CARS program further restricted the supply of
secondary market vehicles, the majority of vehicles traded in were older and had higher mileage than
the average vehicle in the secondary market. In the case that the trade-in vehicle was not high mileage,
they were likely to have been in poor condition or in need of repairs exceeding their value, indicating
that their net worth was less (sic) likely less than the maximum $4,500 credit allowed under the CARS
program. Overall, used vehicle prices have increased over the past 9 months while used vehicle pricing
in the lower price tiers ($5,000 and below) has remained steady in September 2009 (NHTSA, Report,
2009).
We intended, as part of this study, to more formally analyze the impact of Cash for Clunkers on used-car
sales in the study area. Unfortunately, due to low response from used-car dealers, and due to inconsistencies in
the data set, the evidence regarding the impact of the program on the used-car market is inconclusive. Our a priori
assumption, based on economic theory, was that used-car sales in the study area would be adversely affected by the
program’s implementation. This comports with the notion that, at least to some extent, new and used motor vehicles
serve as substitutes for one another. An incentive that encourages new-car purchases should thus cause a reduction in
spending on used vehicles.
Some used-car dealers who responded to the survey reported decreased sales during the CARS rebate period,
as was expected. However, contrary to our assumption, nearly an equal number of respondents reported that sales of
used cars at their lots actually increased during the rebate period. The only plausible explanation for this result is that
demand for all vehicles increased as the announcements and advertisements associated with the Cash for Clunkers
program created a kind of “car-buying mindset” among consumers (as is consistent with Type 5 consumers in Table
2).
There is another manner in which used-car dealers may have been affected by the Cash for Clunkers program,
and which NHTSA alludes to in its statement above. Under ordinary circumstances, vehicles traded in at a new
dealership are generally sold into the after-market and eventually make their way to used-car lots. Vehicles traded
in through Cash for Clunkers were disabled, thereby reducing the number of used cars sold into the after-market.
More than one used-car dealer reported that its operations were adversely affected by the reduction in after-market
vehicles. Several used-car dealers reported that sales decreased immediately after the CARS rebate period, although
it is not clear whether their sales declined due to the cessation of the car-buying mentality among consumers or due
to a lack of available inventory.
Because responses we received from used-car dealers were so widely divergent, the overall impact of Cash for
Clunkers on the used-car market cannot be reliably estimated from our data set. However, the survey responses do
point out some obvious areas for future inquiry. In assessing the overall economic impact of a vehicle scrappage
program such as Cash for Clunkers, the used-car market cannot simply be ignored (as almost all prior studies have
done). Analyzing the impact on the used-car market is especially important in evaluating the redistributional effects
of the program. If, as economic theory would suggest, vehicle scrappage programs cause clunker prices to increase,
then drivers of clunkers (who may be assumed to be lower-income consumers) are harmed by such programs. Any
such impacts have to be carefully weighed against perceived benefits from the program, such as economic stimulus
or reductions in emissions.
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TABLE 2

Consumer Types in Relation to CARS
Consumer Type

Motivation

Contributed to Stimulus?

1

Was already planning to purchase a
qualifying new vehicle during the
CARS rebate period

No

2

Would have purchased a qualifying
new vehicle in the near future (i.e.,
during recession) but was enticed
into moving up purchase to CARS
rebate period

No

3

Would have purchased a qualifying
new vehicle in the distant future
(i.e., post recession) but was enticed
into moving up purchase to CARS
rebate period

Yes

4

Would have purchased a used
vehicle (in any period) but was
enticed into trading up to a
qualifying new vehicle

Yes

5

Enticed by “car-buying mindset”
into purchasing a used vehicle or
non-qualifying new vehicle during
CARS period

Yes

Other industry experts weighed in on the size and
timing of the payback effect. Ford’s President of the
Americas, Mark Fields, “estimated about thirty percent
to forty percent of its [Ford’s] clunker sales were ‘truly
incremental,’ meaning that they came from consumers
who had no plans previously to buy a car. The rest, he
said, came from people who were going to buy a car
later on” (Strumpf and Fowler 2009). GM’s Executive
Director of Global Market and Industry Analysis, Michael
DiGiovanni, estimated that only “about 200,000 of the
700,000 sold under the clunkers program were pulled
ahead from future months” (Welch and Kiley 2009).
Moody’s Investors Service estimated that “About sixty
percent of the vehicles sold with clunker rebates were
purchased by consumers who were not otherwise intending
to buy” (Bennett 2009). Economic consulting firm IHS
Global Insight estimated that Cash for Clunkers increased
motor vehicle sales by about 600,000 units for 2009
(IHS Global Insight 2009). J.D. Power and Associates
estimated a net increase of 300,000 new vehicles sold in
2009 due to Cash for Clunkers, but the industry forecaster
also lowered its projection slightly for new-car sales in
2010 due to the program (J.D. Power and Associates
2009). Leading economic consulting firm Macroeconomic
Advisers, advancing a viewpoint similar to that of
Edmunds.com, argued that “almost all the sales under

this program just moved forward transactions that would
otherwise have taken place over the next several months”
(Macroeconomic Advisers 2009).
The most comprehensive analysis of Cash for
Clunkers to date is the study by NHTSA published in
December 2009 as a report to Congress. Because NHTSA
administered the program, the agency had access to data
not (yet) readily available to other analysts. The NHTSA
study concluded that Cash for Clunkers added $6.8 billion
to GDP, contributing significantly to GDP growth in the
third quarter of 2009 and leading to more than 60,000 jobs
created or saved (NHTSA, Report, 2009).
In calculating the size of the payback effect, NHTSA
relied on survey data gathered from consumers who
actually participated in Cash for Clunkers. In principle,
data collected directly from consumers participating in the
program should provide the best insight into the size and
timing of the payback effect. However, one of the results
of the NHTSA’s consumer survey casts significant doubt
on the survey’s validity. The surprising result is that 35
percent of the respondents, all of whom traded in clunkers,
indicated that they would not have replaced their vehicles
in the absence of the CARS incentive. We can assume only
that participants who responded this way meant that they
would not have traded in their vehicles in the absence of
the government incentive but rather sold them with the
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expectation that the sale price of the vehicles would be
greater than the trade-in values or continued to drive them.
Such respondents may still have purchased a new vehicle
in the near future, and so this group of responses to the
NHTSA survey provides little useful information regarding
the size or the timing of the payback effect.

Initial Impact on New Vehicle Sales

The Payback Effect
The size and timing of the payback effect
associated with Cash for Clunkers became a major
point of contention between the White House
and analysts at Edmunds.com in the fall of 2009.
Edmunds.com argued that of the roughly 690,000
vehicles sold nationally through Cash for Clunkers,
only 125,000 represented true incremental sales;
that is, sales above and beyond what would have
ultimately occurred without the incentive program
(Edmunds.com 2009). Edmunds.com examined
the historical relationship between the sales trend
for luxury (and other non-qualifying vehicles) as a
percentage of the sales growth rate for motor vehicles
overall. Examining sales of non-qualifying vehicles
during the CARS rebate period, the Edmunds.com
analysts derived estimates of what sales for CARSqualifying vehicles would have been if Cash for
Clunkers had not been instituted. The Edmunds.com
team concluded that, although sales of new cars in
July and August were substantially higher than would
have been the case without Cash for Clunkers, sales in
the last four months of 2009 were actually lower than
they would have been if CARS had not existed. More
succinctly, the Edmunds.com study concluded that
consumers shifted a sizable portion of their spending
on new cars forward from the latter part of the year
into the CARS rebate period.
Through its blog site, the White House disputed
the results of the Edmunds.com study, pointing out
that “[t]he Edmunds’ analysis rests on the assumption
that the market for cars that didn’t qualify for Cash for
Clunkers was completely unaffected by this program.
. . . This analysis ignores not only the price impacts
that a program like Cash for Clunkers has on the rest
of the vehicle market, but the reports from across the
country that people were drawn into dealerships by
the Cash for Clunkers program and ended up buying
cars even though their old car was not eligible for the
program” (Weisenthal 2009).
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We estimate that between 307 and 701 new motor
vehicles were sold in St. Charles County during the
CARS rebate period that would not have been sold in the
program’s absence. The range is necessarily large because
of the small sample size; however, our best estimate is
that new-car dealers in the county sold a total of about
504 vehicles during the CARS rebate period due to the
program. The average price of a new vehicle sold as a
result of Cash for Clunkers in St. Charles County was
$22,549. Based on these figures, new-car sales in the
county were between $6.9 million and $5.8 million higher
during the CARS rebate period than they would have
been without the program. Our best estimate is that new
vehicle sales in the county were $11.4 million higher than
what they would have been in the program’s absence.
Additionally, new-car dealers in the county netted, on
average, about $73 per disabled clunker (disposal costs
subtracted from salvage revenues). This translates into
estimated additional revenues for new-car dealers ranging
from $39,135 to $89,360 for selling the disabled clunkers.
These estimates represent the initial direct impact of
the Cash for Clunkers program on new-car sales in the
county. Due to the multiplier effect associated with an
increase in spending, the ultimate impact on the county’s
economy is larger than the stated amounts. We estimate
that the county’s output increased between $11 million
and $25.2 million—after taking the multiplier effects into
account—due to the initial round of incremental spending
associated with Cash for Clunkers. Additionally, due to the
program’s implementation, between 25 and 56 jobs were
added in the county, although, as NHTSA points out, “[w]
hile hiring of both dealer sales personnel and manufacturer
production staff would be likely responses to the sales
spike that resulted from CARS, it is not clear whether
added jobs created by this activity will be temporary or
permanent” (NHTSA, Report, 2009). In our view, any job
creation attributable to CARS was likely only temporary
in nature, diminished by the payback effect. In fact, to
the extent auto dealers and firms in related industries
anticipated a payback effect, the predicted job creation
may not have occurred at all, and may instead have taken
the form of overtime for current employees.
Table 3 summarizes the estimated economic impacts
on St. Charles County of the Cash for Clunkers program.
It is important to bear in mind that the estimates in
Table 3 only represent the one-time spike in new-car
sales that occurred over the CARS rebate period (and are
attributable to the program’s existence); the estimates do
not take into consideration the payback effect discussed
above. Although some used-car dealers in the survey
reported an increase in sales immediately following the

rebate period, none of the new-car dealers reported an
increase. On average, new-car dealers indicated a drop
in normal sales levels of 23 to 30 percent in the months
following the Cash for Clunkers rebate period. The surveys
were distributed approximately three months after the end
of the rebate period, which means that new-car dealers
experienced lower-than-normal sales for at least that
number of months. Based on the average decline in sales
reported by new-car dealers in the survey, we estimate that
between 51 percent and 67 percent of the new vehicles
sold in St. Charles County due to Cash for Clunkers were
pulled forward—or paid back—from the three-month
period immediately following the rebate period. In other
words, at least half, and as much as two-thirds, of the
vehicle sales that occurred through the program would
have taken place anyway before the end of 2009.

The Relevance of St. Charles County

St. Charles County, selected as the study area
primarily due to its proximity to the research team, has
an unemployment rate (8.5 percent) that is marginally
less than the state’s rate of 9.2 percent (December 2009
reported figures, not seasonally adjusted), although the
unemployment rate in the St. Louis Metro Area has
hovered near the national rate through the better part
of the recession (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010a
and 2010b). In other words, the recession that began in
December 2007 has resulted in an unemployment profile
for St. Charles County similar to that of the rest of the state
and not drastically different from the national average.
In the months leading up to the implementation of Cash
for Clunkers, the St. Louis region suffered a number of
plant closings and mass layoffs similar to those that have
occurred in other parts of the country. These negative
economic factors have affected residents of the study
area, particularly the layoffs and temporary closing of
the General Motors assembly plant located in the county,
which occurred in the summer of 2009.
There is no reason to believe St. Charles County
residents’ preferences with respect to new versus used
automobiles differed greatly from those of similarly
situated consumers in other suburban areas of the country.
Yet it is important to note that the county does differ from
the average suburban county in two important ways.
First, according to Census Bureau projections, St. Charles
County has been one of the nation’s fastest growing
counties in recent years, with an estimated population
growth rate of 23 percent from 2000 to 2008 (U.S.
Census Bureau 2010a). Second, St. Charles County is the
wealthiest county in the state, with a median household
income in 2007 of approximately $68,000 compared to
a median household income for the state of $45,000 and
the nation of approximately $51,000 (U.S. Census Bureau
2010a and 2010b).
One other noteworthy difference between the study
area and the average U.S. suburban county is the presence
of the aforementioned General Motors assembly plant
in the city of Wentzville. To the extent persons affiliated
with the GM plant demonstrate a preference for GM
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The Multiplier Effect and Job Creation
The general idea of the multiplier effect is that
a dollar spent in the regional economy ultimately
translates into more than a dollar’s worth of spending.
For example, the auto dealership that sells more
cars—due to a government incentive program or
otherwise—must purchase more supplies such as fuel,
stationery, etc. A portion of those purchases will be
from other firms in the region. In turn, those firms
that supply inputs to the auto dealer must purchase
more inputs for themselves, and so on. Also, beyond
some threshold, more direct spending will necessitate
firms hiring more workers, and those workers will
spend part of their incomes in the region, further
contributing to the multiplier effect.
We used the output multiplier for the motor
vehicle retail sales sector from the regional economic
model IMPLAN (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc.)
to estimate the total economic impact of the increase
in direct sales in new motor vehicles. We also
derived estimates for direct government expenditures
on CARS vouchers in the county. According to
NHTSA, “The CEA estimates that $92,000 of direct
government spending creates one job-year” (NHSTA,
Report, 2009). Applying this ratio to the estimated
direct government expenditures in the county for
CARS vouchers, we calculated estimates for the
number of jobs created in the county due to the Cash
for Clunkers program.
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products, the results of the survey may be skewed, but
only with respect to the mix (as opposed to the volume)
of new vehicles sold under Cash for Clunkers. Then too,
the mere presence of auto manufacturing in the county
implies that the final impact on output and employment
of Cash for Clunkers will be greater than would be the
case for a county that has no auto manufacturing presence.
However, because of the EPA fuel-efficiency ratings of the
particular van models assembled at the Wentzville plant
(the Chevrolet Express and the GMC Savana), the impact
of Cash for Clunkers on auto production in the county was
likely modest.

Methodology

Twenty two new-car dealerships in St. Charles
County participated in Cash for Clunkers. The research
team hand-delivered surveys (described in greater detail
below) to managers at each of these dealerships. We asked
dealers participating in the survey not to identify their
personal names or their companies. We distributed the
surveys approximately three months after the conclusion
of the rebate period, allowing respondents time to assess
the impacts of the program on their sales in the period
immediately following the CARS rebate period.
A few weeks later, the research team paid each
dealer a second visit. During these follow-up visits, the
research team asked if the manager had completed the
survey. If not, we left another copy and again asked for
the manager’s participation. Twelve dealers responded in
the initial round. One additional dealer responded after

the follow-up visits. There was no follow-up round of
surveys for used-car dealers. Out of 47 new- and used-car
dealers in the study area that received surveys, 23 of them
responded for an overall response rate of 49 percent. More
important, though, is the response rate for new car dealers
since the primary economic impact of vehicle scrappage
programs such as Cash for Clunkers occurs through sales
of new vehicles. Of the population of new-car dealers
in the county that participated in Cash for Clunkers, 59
percent completed and returned surveys.
In calculating the total direct impact of Cash for
Clunkers on new-car sales in the county, we added newcar sales reported by the survey respondents to estimated
new-car sales of non-respondents. To arrive at an estimate
of new-car sales for non-responding dealers, we devised
a method for attributing sales figures to non-respondents
while maintaining the anonymity of respondents. Survey
responses representing sales due to Cash for Clunkers
were adjusted to account for respondent size (i.e., number
of cars on the lot). The adjustment might be viewed as
something akin to the per capita GDP calculation. For
example, if a dealership that carries 100 vehicles on the
lot on average reported that it sold 50 vehicles through the
CARS program, its “per capita” sales volume would be
0.5 vehicles. This figure was determined for all new-dealer
respondents and an average was calculated. Applying a
margin of error that is consistent with a ninety percent
confidence interval, we derived a range for the estimated
total number of vehicles sold in the county due to the
Cash for Clunkers program. Using the weighted-average

TABLE 3

Economic Impacts of CARS on St. Charles County
Variable Impacted

Estimated Range

Best Estimate

New motor vehicles sold
due to CARS program

307 to 701

504

Increase in direct sales
(new motor vehicles)
due to CARS program

$6.9 million to
$15.8 million

$11.4 million

Net salvage revenues
for disabled clunkers

$39,135 to $89,360

$64,248

Total CARS vouchers submitted

536 to 1,224

880

Total direct government spending
on CARS vouchers

$2.3 million to
$5.1 million

$3.7 million

Total initial increase in output
due to CARS program
(i.e., with multiplier effects)

$11 million to
$25.2 million

$18.1 million

Total increase in employment
(number of jobs added)
due to CARS program

25 to 56

40
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sales price per new vehicle sold, along with the estimated
number of new vehicles sold, we calculated a range for the
estimated total sales in the county attributable to Cash for
Clunkers.

Conclusion

The results in Table 3 make it appear as though
the federal government achieved its primary goal of
stimulating economic activity. Direct government
spending in the county in the amount of $3.7 million
led to an increase in economic output of $18.1 million.
However, as noted in the previous section, the output
estimate represents a one-time spike in economic activity.
If the payback effect continued into 2010, then it might
ultimately be the case that the spending on CARS vouchers
generated little economic activity above and beyond what
would have occurred in the program’s absence.
We estimated that approximately 880 CARS vouchers
were turned in by new-car dealers in the county, but
that possibly 376 new vehicles would have sold during
the rebate period anyway. For the 504 vehicles that sold
during the CARS period due to the incentive, the federal
government paid about $7,300 per traded-in clunker—not
the average voucher amount of $4,209 reported by
NHTSA. Using the most conservative estimate of the
payback effect, based on the survey data, 51 percent of
the 504 vehicles—or 257 vehicles—would have sold
anyway in the three months following the rebate period.
The sales of those 257 vehicles did not contribute to an
economic stimulus because they were pulled forward from
a time period when the economy was still in recession. For
the remaining 247 vehicles, the government paid about
$14,980 per traded-in clunker. The true cost per clunker
purchased by the government could be even higher if the
payback effect continued into the early months of 2010.
(Edmunds.com [2009] estimated that the government
ultimately paid around $24,000 per clunker, which is close
to the $22,290 per clunker figure we calculated using our
least conservative estimate of the payback effect.)
Accurately quantifying the payback effect is, in
our view, the most important issue in assessing the true
stimulative impact of vehicle scrappage programs such
as Cash for Clunkers. Even though NHTSA collected
data from consumers who participated in the program,
the questions regarding the payback effect on the national
level remain unanswered, at least in our minds, due to
apparent problems with the NHTSA survey. Our estimates
of the payback effect for St. Charles County are more
in line with those of Edmunds.com and Macroeconomic
Advisers than with the NHTSA. There is still much
disagreement among experts regarding this issue, and so it
is clearly a key area for further study.
We did not attempt to assess the environmental
impact of Cash for Clunkers on the study area. Moreover,
it is clear that the government’s environmental goal was
secondary to that of stimulating the auto industry. We also
did not attempt to analyze the impact on sales tax revenue
or fuel tax revenue even though both are important public
policy issues.

As mentioned in a previous section, the survey
solicited suggestions for improving the Cash for Clunkers
program. Several auto dealers, both new and used,
expressed concern that the clunker rebates were available
for foreign-made vehicles. Several used-car dealers
expressed frustration that the program failed to provide
help to small independent businessmen. Some new-car
dealers indicated that the program was unduly burdensome
from an administrative standpoint. One dealer’s comments
sum up this attitude well: “It would have been better if
the paperwork and processing burden wouldn’t have
been put on the dealership. Maybe a prequalified voucher
system would have been better. It was very stressful for
us and was a huge burden that caused massive overtime to
complete.”
Other data from new-car dealers support the claim that
the program was replete with administrative problems. The
average length of time new dealerships waited to receive
voucher payments from the federal government ranged
from eighteen days to sixty days, and nearly all of the newcar dealers who responded indicated that their business
operations were effected by delays in receiving payment (a
few respondents even stated that delayed payments created
cash-flow problems). The majority of new-car dealers also
indicated that their sales were hampered by issues with
depleted inventory, which implies that dealers did not have
adequate time to ramp up for the program, and/or the cashflow problems associated with delayed voucher payments
prevented them from replenishing inventories in a timely
manner.
In spite of these administrative problems, the NHTSA
claims that Cash for Clunkers was a success. Based on our
results, it appears that the program increased economic
activity in St. Charles County, but there is evidence that
the economic activity may not have been sustained. Any
job creation in the county due to the program was likely
of limited duration. To the extent there were Type 3 and
Type 4 consumers (see Table 2) purchasing new vehicles
during the rebate period, new-car dealers in the county
benefited. To the extent there were Type 5 consumers
making purchases, new- and used-car dealers benefited
(although the presence of Type 4 consumers in the market
harmed used-car dealers). It is assumed that all consumers
who participated in the program benefited, otherwise they
would not have taken advantage of the rebate. However,
as we have already pointed out, the cost of the program on
a per-voucher basis, at least for St. Charles County, was
much greater than the government-issued statistics reveal.
It is these costs that must be considered when weighing the
ultimate costs and benefits—and thus the overall success
or failure—of the Cash for Clunkers program.
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UNOCAL was once a major oil exporter and marketer
that in 2005 merged with Chevron Corporation.
Unlike Cash for Clunkers, the SCRAP program did not
require participants to purchase a replacement vehicle
(Shaheen, et al. 1994).
Vehicle scrappage programs initiated in 2009 in France,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg, Cyprus, the
United Kingdom, and the U.S. had the stated goals of
stimulating the auto industry and reducing greenhouse
gas emissions (Allan, et al. 2009).
12,272 transactions that did not meet CARS program
criteria were cancelled by the dealers or NHTSA
(NHTSA 2009).
The base MSRP is the price on the window sticker
before any dealer accessories, optional equipment, taxes,
or destination charges are added.
Car buyers in New Hampshire and Wisconsin were
exempted from this rule, as those states have no
insurance requirement under state law.
Salvagers were permitted to strip and resell all parts of
the traded-in clunkers except for the engines.
Consumers who purchased luxury vehicles or other
non-qualifying vehicles during the rebate period and
were already planning to do so are not considered in this
classification scheme. Clearly purchases in this category
cannot be attributed to Cash for Clunkers.
In order to estimate the incremental or CARS-induced
sales, the CEA calculated a figure for normal monthly
clunker-replacement in the absence of Cash for
Clunkers. The CEA assumptions about the payback
effect were based on information from multiple sources,
including Ford Motor Company, General Motors, J.P.
Morgan, Moody’s Investors Service, Goldman Sachs,
IHS Global Insight, and the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago. The CEA further analyzed the payback
effect by examining two prior periods in which new
vehicle sales were boosted through financial incentives
programs: the zero-percent financing and other incentive
programs offered following the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks in New York and the expiration of
employee discount pricing incentives in 2005 (the
idea of the latter being that the period just prior to the
expiration of employee pricing incentives would see a
CARS-type increase in new-car sales) (CEA 2009).
NHTSA acknowledges the improbability of this result
and makes an adjustment for it (NHTSA 2009). Still,
this surprising and unlikely result casts significant doubt
on the validity of the survey instrument and/or the
method of collection.
This figure represents a weighted average (weighted by
number of vehicles sold as a result of CARS).

12
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This figure represents a weighted averaged, with the
number of clunkers accepted for trade serving as the
weight.
As a check of our estimates, we compared the total
CARS vouchers submitted in the county using our
estimation method with the total CARS vouchers
submitted using a “top-down” estimation method. For
the top-down method we multiplied the ratio of St.
Charles County’s population to the state’s population by
the number of CARS vouchers submitted in Missouri
from the NHTSA database. The top-down method yields
an estimated number of vouchers submitted for the
county that is very close to the 880 vouchers we estimate
using our “bottom-up” method.
Bureau, but most residents would likely consider it more
suburban in nature.
Given that our survey was anonymous, we did not solicit
data from auto dealers regarding the specific makes and
models of vehicles sold through CARS.
Our estimation technique captures any added production
and employment that occurred at the Wentzville GM
plant due to CARS-induced sales that took place in
the county. But CARS-induced sales of the particular
models produced at the Wentzville plant that occurred
outside the county are not be captured in the results.
This impact is likely to be small; Chevrolet and GMS
together accounted for only about fourteen percent of
total sales of all the makes of vehicles of sold through
Cash for Clunkers. Moreover, Category 2 and Category
3 trucks only accounted for about 7 percent of the
vehicle types sold through CARS.
With the exception of one dealership, whose manager
was not available at the time of the research team visits.
For the purposes of this study, cars sold as part of Cash
for Clunkers includes vehicles for which consumers
received the CARS rebate, as well as new vehicles that
did not qualify for the rebate but for which the dealer
chose to grant the rebate anyway (out of the dealer’s
own profits).
This figure does not include the NHTSA’s administrative
costs.
The output multiplier used from IMPLAN is “Retail
Stores – Motor Vehicle and Parts,” Industry Code 320.
This was achieved by calculating the ratio of submitted
vouchers to cars sold due to Cash for Clunkers for the
sample and then applying that ratio to the estimated
number of cars sold by all new-car dealers due to the
rebate. The average voucher amount was around $4,200,
according to our survey as well as the NHTSA data.
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